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Abstract: 
State responses to the global financial and European sovereign debt crisis have been dominated 
by a paradigm of austerity. This paradigm has called for the reduction of public expenditure on 
the basis that recent economic crises were caused by excessive public spending and debt. In 
contrast to explanations of austerity’s persistence that focus on the role of powerful actors or 
institutions, this article will highlight the role of discourse and argumentation. To do so, the 
article presents a political claims analysis of public debates on austerity in the mass media in the 
United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland between 2010-2013. In doing so, the article contributes 
to broader discussions on the resilience of neoliberalism since the global financial and European 
sovereign debt crises by calling for a greater appreciation of the variegated nature of austerity's 
application in different national contexts. 
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Introduction 
State responses to the global financial and European sovereign debt crisis have been 
dominated by policies of deficit reduction, expansionary fiscal contraction and internal 
devaluation, popularly dubbed as constituting an austerity discourse. The logic within this 
paradigm has been that reductions in public expenditure (Giavazzi & Pagano, 1990) and lower 
public debt (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010) incentivises private consumption and overall growth. This 
policy strategy has been visible both within the conditionality of European bailout packages and 
as a democratic choice, for example Germany favouring a policy of fiscal rectitude and the 
United Kingdom (UK) embarking since 2010 on comprehensive budget cuts. The passage of a 
‘balanced budget’ rule within the 2012 European Fiscal Compact suggests austerity will be a 
semi-permanent policy strategy in Europe for years to come.  
Austerity has been a distinctly neoliberal response to the crisis. Since the tenures of Reagan and 
Thatcher in the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberalism has had a profound effect on re-orienting public 
policy and economic processes away from a preceding Keynesian-welfare model. The neoliberal 
paradigm has broadly consisted of policies placing greater faith in market-based means of 
governance and allocation, the prioritisation of combating inflation over full employment, the 
privatisation of state assets, and welfare retrenchment. Economically, the development of 
neoliberalism has seen the increased mobility of international capital, the substantial growth of 
financial service industries, and the growing complexity of financial products and trading.  
Given the centrality of the financial sector to neoliberalism, and the catastrophic failure of 
financial markets, many expected that the neoliberal paradigm would have collapsed. Instead, 
austerity can arguably be seen as representing the continuity of neoliberalism in the face of the 
crisis. An emergent literature on the resilience of neoliberalism has sought to explain this 
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development. Typically, explanations have emphasised the relative importance of either ideas 
(Blyth, 2013b), interests (Overbeek & van Apeldoorn, 2012), or institutions (Cahill, 2014). This 
article will, instead, focus on the interaction between these elements through a discursive 
institutional (DI) perspective (Schmidt, 2008). Specifically, it will focus on the public sphere in 
the UK and Republic of Ireland (hereafter Ireland) as a site in which austerity has been 
negotiated and institutionalised via a communicative process.  
It has been widely discussed how neoliberalization manifest differently across various national 
contexts (Soederberg, Menz, & Cerny, 2005). Building on this, the article will unpack austerity’s 
variegated nature by exploring empirically the country specific dynamics of austerity in the UK 
and Ireland. The investigation is based on a political claims analysis of public debates in the UK 
and Ireland between 2010 and 2013, in addition to interviews with societal actors in the two 
countries. The article will analyse the arguments used in support and opposition to austerity, the 
actors using them, and how different arguments were politically institutionalised, to explore how 
austerity manifest in different national contexts. The next section will give an overview of the 
literature concerning the resilience of neoliberalism. The article will consider the relationship 
between ideas, interests, and institutions in this literature, arguing for a DI approach to synthesise 
these elements. An analytical section will introduce the frames articulating and contesting 
austerity, their relative mobilisation, and how this differs between the UK and Ireland. A 
concluding section will reflect on austerity beyond framing, calling for a greater openness in 
analyses of austerity to consider the variegated way it has been applied across Europe. 
Neoliberal Resilience: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions  
When accounting for the persistence of neoliberalism in Europe, there is a tendency to 
reduce explanations to one factor or another between ideas, interests, or institutions. Regarding 
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interests, austerity has been explained in terms of the role of powerful actors. These include the 
rise of Germany as a regional power, dictating the terms of European economic governance 
(Paterson, 2011); the empowerment of European and international institutions in managing the 
sovereign debt crisis through technocratic means (Crum, 2013); or the structural power of global 
financial capital over the discretion of national governments (Overbeek & van Apeldoorn, 2012). 
On institutions, austerity has been said to have endured through the crisis because of the historic 
embedding of neoliberal rules and practices within institutional structures, limiting the scope for 
alternatives in the face of the crisis (Cahill, 2014). This has been particularly evident in the 
Eurozone, where the Maastricht convergence criteria and Stability and Growth Pact meant 
policies of austerity have been necessary since the 1990s. Finally, concerning ideas, austerity has 
been labelled as ‘ideology’, slavishly followed by those who fall under its cognitive trap, despite 
its manifest failures (Blyth, 2013a, 2013b). 
Such hard-nosed explanations are useful in spotlighting one element or another in the rise of 
austerity. However, given the complexity of socio-political change, such reductionist 
explanations risk missing the interactions between these elements. By bracketing off ideas, 
institutions, and interests as competing explanations, analyses of austerity miss the fact that each 
element relies on the other to become causally significant. The institutional environments actors 
inhabit, for example, indeed poses real constraints on the range of conceivable actions (Thelen, 
Longstreth, & Steinmo, 1992). But an awareness of such institutional constraints does little to 
explain processes of institutional change without ideational innovation (Béland, 2009). Similarly, 
a belief that an actor’s behaviour reflects their materially derived interests rests on an unrealistic 
assumption that actors have access to sufficient information about their context to make such a 
judgement (Blyth, 2003). As such, without understanding an actor’s perceptions, their behaviour 
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cannot be explained (Hay, 2011). This does not, however, mean ideas rule as detached and 
independently responsible causal factors. Without attaching to certain actors and being mobilised 
within institutions, particular ideas would have no causal significance (Bieler & Morton, 2008).   
Relying too heavily on one factor or another leads to deterministic explanations of austerity’s 
rise by assuming binding structural conditions – be they rules (institutions), powerful actors 
(interests), or dominant ideologies (ideas). Instead, to understand how austerity has become a 
dominant paradigm in Europe means to not assume either factor as a priori given, but to instead 
analyse their formation through their interaction. A discursive or constructivist institutional 
approach (hereafter DI) offers such a dynamic view (Schmidt, 2008). Such an approach explores 
the interaction between ‘background ideational abilities’, as the perceived institutional 
constraints and pressures within which actors operate, and the ‘foreground discursive abilities’ as 
actors’ capacities to critically re-think and challenge these structures (Schmidt, 2011, p. 48). 
Institutions should therefore be seen less as already-given and deterministically constraining, but 
rather as selectively emphasised, downplayed, or ignored via processes of bricolage (Carstensen, 
2011). On this basis, a key question in examining the resilience of austerity is how actors used 
their institutional environments to achieve particular policy goals. Similarly, rather than reading 
off an actors’ interests from their material environments, a DI approach asks how interests and 
strategies are formed in the process of interacting with others. Concerning the persistence of 
austerity, this means to ask how actors formed positions on austerity in the course of debating it. 
Ideas are, then, given a privileged position in a DI approach. They are not, however, treated as 
detached from structurally assumed interests or institutions. Rather, ideas or, more specifically, 
discursive interaction, is the process through which interests, strategies, and institutions are 
constructed. 
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Moments of crisis have been crucial for a DI analysis of political change (Blyth, 2002). Rather 
than exogenous shocks spontaneously driving institutional transformation, crisis from a DI 
perspective is considered an endogenous process. When contradictions accumulate within a 
regime, the narrative that is ascribed to these contradictions in constituting them as a moment of 
crisis (or not) has a significant influence over the types of policy responses imaginable (Hay, 
1999). Framing is a central element of crisis narratives that describes the ‘process of selecting, 
emphasizing and organizing aspects of complex issues according to an overriding evaluative or 
analytical criterion’ (Daviter, 2007, p. 654). Drawing on the social movement literature, the 
article will explore processes of framing in the discursive contestation of austerity in the UK and 
Ireland. Benford and Snow identified three core processes frames perform: diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational (Benford & Snow, 2000). Diagnoses define problems and attribute 
blame and responsibility for them. Problems do not exist ‘out there’, but are constructed through 
framing such that ‘what political issues are “about” constitutes consequential choices in their 
own right’ (Daviter, 2007, p. 656). Prognoses suggest solutions to these problems. Motivations 
rationalise a call for action based on demands like urgency, necessity, or obligation. A further 
distinction within frames is the cognitive and normative functions they can serve. Frames can 
serve a cognitive function ‘by speaking to their interest-based logic and necessity,’ and a 
normative function through appeals to values or appropriateness (Schmidt, 2008). 
In exploring how austerity has persisted, five factors of neoliberalism’s resilience have been 
highlighted that can be applied here: its strength as a discourse compared to possible alternatives, 
its flexibility in the face of opposition, the divergence of rhetoric and practice, its support from 
powerful actors, and its embedding within institutions (Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013). First, despite 
being widely criticised, the narrative of austerity has been remarkably successful in defining the 
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crisis as one of public debt (Blyth, 2013b). A narrative of ‘balancing the books’ has been highly 
resonant with a public more familiar with the accountancy of households than governments. 
Furthermore, alternatives to austerity faced an uphill battle in overturning a longstanding 
neoliberal paradigm entrenched in common sense. Second, neoliberalism’s capacity to 
incorporate new issues, co-opt critiques, and overlook cognitive dissonance has allowed austerity 
to weather any substantive challenge (Mirowski, 2013). Third, the disconnect between austerity 
as rhetoric and as practice has meant that while as a discourse austerity has emphasised the 
necessity of public debt and expenditure reductions, both have remained relatively static across 
Europe. This reflects a general trend that neoliberal ideas have generally been more important in 
altering the terms of political contestation, rather than being fully implemented (Schmidt & 
Thatcher, 2013, p. 410). Fourth, the constellation of actors supporting austerity makes it a 
materially influential force, entrenching it as an orienting paradigm. Fifth, established rules and 
procedures favour the pursuit of austerity measures over alternatives. For example, the ECB has 
only a limited mandate that constrained its possible responses to the crisis, while established 
deficit rules in the Stability and Growth Pact favoured austerity as a response to the crisis. 
Focusing on processes of framing in public debates on austerity will allow us to analyse the 
interaction between ideas, interests, and institutions in constructing austerity as an orienting 
paradigm. Rather than taking austerity as given, a framing approach considers the interaction 
between the arguments used by different actors for and against austerity in their institutional 
contexts. In doing so, the intention is not to locate the causal significance of either ideas, 
interests, or institutions for austerity’s rise. Instead, we will unpack how austerity became 
entrenched as an orienting paradigm through a process of communicative interaction. By 
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adopting such an open-ended perspective on austerity, it will be possible to show its variegated 
nature across the different national contexts of the UK and Ireland. 
Method 
Political claims analysis is an advantageous method for studying public debates because 
it captures the breadth of actors mobilising within the public sphere as a quantitative 
measurement, along with a qualitative insight into actors’ framing of issues (Koopmans & 
Statham, 1999). The method involves systematically coding political claims made by actors 
within public debates, as reported within the mass print media. A political claim is ‘the 
expression of a political opinion by physical or verbal action (statement, institutional decision, 
court ruling, protest, etc.) by different types of actors (media, governments, civil society actors 
etc.)’ (Della Porta & Caiani, 2009, p. 29). Two important delineations of a claim are that they are 
‘the result of purposive strategic action by the claimant’ and that they are political, meaning they 
refer to collective social problems (Koopmans, 2002, p. 3). Claims were qualitatively coded from 
sampled newspaper articles by completing Table 1, adapted from Koopmans (2002). Each row of 
the table refers to an individual claim. Not all cells in each row need to be completed to 
constitute a claim. The minimum requirement is the presence of a subject actor, a verb indicating 
strategic action and either an issue or frame related to austerity to substantiate this action. Actors 
fell into seven categories: state, political, business, civil, expert, macro (electorates, whole 
countries, etc.) and media. Frames were categorised iteratively by ordering the justifications 
actors used when making a claim into distinguishable frames according to diagnostic, prognostic, 
and motivational processes. Whether an actor articulated or contested austerity was determined 
by positions that either explicitly supported/opposed austerity, referred to it positively/negatively 
or implemented/resisted an austerity policy. The coding process was performed by a single 
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researcher according to a code book, safeguarding against possible issues of inter-coder 
reliability. The use of a single researcher comes, however, with the risk that coding decisions 
reflect a personal bias. Transparency of the coding process (by making the code book available) 
therefore compensates for this risk.1 
Table 1. Political claims 
WHO – (subject 
actor/claimant) 
AT WHOM – (addressee 
of claim) 
WHAT – 
(substantive issue) 
WHY – (justification) For or 
against 
austerity 
UK, Claim 114 – 
Thousands of 
protesters 
Protest (verb) against 
Liberal Democrats at 
their party conference 
Over their role in 
government cuts 
 Against 
Ireland, Claim 50 – 
Fine Gael leader 
Enda Kenny 
 Announces (verb) 
opposition to 
water charges and 
property taxes 
 Against 
Ireland, Claim 32 – 
European Socialist 
Party’s Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen 
Criticises (verb) 
European Commission 
For proposed 
budgetary rules 
Because they overly 
focus on budgetary 
cuts and not enough on 
stimulating growth 
Against 
 
The two cases studied here are the UK and Ireland. The cases offer points of similarity and 
difference for comparison. Economically, both countries share a history of following an ‘Anglo-
liberal growth model’, typified by an internationally open economy, flexible labour-markets, 
easy access to credit, and high private debt (Hay & Smith, 2013). Consequently, both countries 
similarly experienced the global financial crisis through the collapse and public rescue of over-
leveraged banks, and subsequent problems of public indebtedness, to which austerity responded. 
The institutional context within which austerity was adopted is, however, a central difference and 
a key point of comparison. In the UK, austerity was a democratic choice. In Ireland, austerity has 
                                                                 
1 The code book is available elaborating the political claims analysis from i.lovering@sussex.ac.uk  
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been heavily influenced by their Eurozone bailout, necessitating a degree of fiscal adjustment. 
Such a case selection means the analysis cannot (and is not trying to) test for the impact of 
discourse in isolation from other factors. Instead, in line with the theoretical approach outlined 
above, the analysis will ask how austerity was constructed differently in two institutional 
environments. A ‘hard-nosed’ explanation of institutional path-dependence or powerful actors 
could be made in explaining austerity in Ireland (because of the influence of European 
institutions through the bailout) and the UK (in terms of the power of finance and the 2010 
election of a government committed to austerity). It will be seen, however, that processes of 
argumentation had a differential impact on the intensity and form of austerity in the two 
countries. 
Two high quality newspapers providing a left/right balance were chosen for each case and 
sampled from the Lexis-Nexis database. Newspapers representing a left/right balance were 
selected to provide a representative picture of the debate in each country. Print media’s ‘intensity 
of usage, public attention and political influence,’ as well as its ease of access for research, 
means it is a worthwhile site for analysing public debates (Mautner, 2008). While some groups 
or frames may be underrepresented within mass print media, it is expected that those groups 
which are relevant to policy stability and change would be found within sites of dominant 
opinion formation, of which the mass print media is central. The Guardian (centre-left) and The 
Daily Telegraph (centre-right) were chosen for the UK. The Irish Times (centre-left) and Irish 
Independent (centre-right) were chosen for Ireland. The period sampled was January 2010 – 
December 2013. The period begins with the May 2010 UK general election (where a 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government was elected and began an austerity 
programme) and the December 2010 Irish bailout. It ends with Ireland formally leaving the 
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bailout programme in December 2013. Eight constructed weeks (where one of each day of the 
week, except Sundays, is selected within consecutive six month blocks) were sampled from the 
period. Eight weeks is in line with the recommended number of constructed weeks necessary for 
a representative sample across the period (Lacy, Riffe, Stoddard, Martin, & Chang, 2011). 
Articles within constructed weeks were selected through key word searches referencing austerity 
as a set of policy practices related to deficit reduction and spending cuts, and as a discourse 
related to fiscal responsibility. The search terms were selected iteratively, initially starting with 
limited searches of ‘austerity’ and adding in related key words until a saturation point was 
reached, where additional key words produced no new or relevant articles. The final search terms 
were: 
“austerity” or “spending cuts” or “financ! responsib!” or “fisc! responsib!” or “fisc! consolida!” 
or “financ! consolida!” or “deficit reduc!” or “intern! deval!”2 
Within the articles sampled, only those that explicitly discussed austerity as a state strategy were 
analysed for claims. In total, 514 claims were coded for Ireland and 763 for the UK. The political 
claims analysis was supplemented with 12 interviews (conducted between March-May 2015) 
with societal actors (ranging from more institutionalised organisations, to informal social 
movements) to broaden the scope of analysis from mass print media to the wider public sphere.  
Framing Austerity 
Before entering the debates on austerity, the frames used to articulate and contest it will 
be presented according to the three framing processes (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational).  
                                                                 
2 ! indicates the possible permutations of each word 
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Articulation 
The austerity paradigm diagnosed the cause of the crisis as profligate state spending, 
which had led to a massive build-up of public debt, and a loss of competitiveness, causing 
prolonged recession. The paradigm proposed substantial cuts to public spending and structural 
reforms to lower labour costs. Austerity has been said to present a ‘paradoxical position of 
“virtuous necessity”’, claimed to be both necessary and an act of political virtue (Clarke & 
Newman, 2012, p. 303). The frames identified articulating austerity reflect this cognitive and 
normative division. 
Cognitive: A cognitive frame diagnosed a cataclysmic fiscal situation that mandated austerity’s 
adoption. Colourful descriptions of the threats governments faced declared, for example, we are 
on ‘the brink of bankruptcy, on the edge of an economic abyss’ (Ireland, Claim 102). Building 
on this diagnosis, proposals for austerity measures were a logical necessity. Zealous proposals 
for deficit reduction framed austerity as an ‘economic rescue mission’ (UK, Claim 435). The 
frame was motivated by a vocabulary of compulsion. Claims emphasised that ‘everybody knows 
one simple fact: the government deficit must be reduced’ (Ireland, Claim 157). Efficacy was also 
important here, encouraging the pursuit of an austerity strategy based on the long term gains it 
promised to deliver through economic growth and competitiveness.  
Normative: As a normative frame, austerity was rationalised as an act of political virtue. A 
diagnosis highlighted the importance of trust and credibility in the relationship between the state 
and international markets, or borrower and creditor. The adoption of austerity strategies, for 
example, were said to ‘help strengthen the credibility’ or ‘win back the trust of international 
investors’ (Ireland, Claim 86; Ireland, Claim 311). Proposals were based on the duty and 
righteousness of making expenditure reductions. This included being ‘committed to ensuring the 
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public sector finances are in order,’ as opposed to the chaos of before, and searching for ‘more 
sustainable funding,’ against the profligacy of the past (Ireland, Claim 50; UK, Claim 673).  
Motivations were expressed through the internal normative obligation of repaying one’s debts. 
Austerity was not only the best thing to do, but the right thing to do. Declarations that ‘[t]his 
profligacy cannot continue’ thus found a virtue in deficit reduction (UK, Claim 437).  
Contestation 
Those opposing austerity generally diagnosed the crisis as caused by wholescale financial market 
and regulatory failure. Large public debts were said to be the result of bank bailouts, rather than 
state profligacy. Such bailouts were in turn considered the result of reckless lending by financial 
institutions. Proposed solutions to this were stricter regulation of financial markets, to prevent 
risky investment practices, and Keynesian policies of economic stimulus, to combat the onset of 
recession. The frames contesting austerity emphasised different aspects of this broader possible 
alternative. 
Economic: An economic diagnosis opposed austerity based on observations or expectations of 
negative growth and the attribution of this to fiscal contraction policies. The frame criticised 
austerity policies as not considering ‘how that would affect the wider economy, and how that 
would affect trade and overall growth’ (Interview 1). These diagnoses ranged from a total 
opposition to austerity on economic terms, to questioning only the intensity and pace of cuts. 
Prognoses sought to ‘temper the austerity agenda with new measures to stimulate growth,’ 
namely counter-cyclical Keynesian packages of stimulus (Ireland, Claim 226). These alternatives 
often shared with pro-austerity claims the objective of reducing public deficits. An interviewee, 
for example, observed that ‘the way to manage fiscal deficit is growth’ (Interview 4). The frame 
served a crucial cognitive function, mobilising knowledge such that ‘Keynes may be dead, but 
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surely we can adopt his teachings’ (UK, Claim 387). A vocabulary of compulsion motivated the 
frame, prioritising growth as the determinant for societal advancement. Claims stated ‘more 
needs to be done to stimulate the European economy’, or stimulus is ‘necessary to sustain 
economic recovery’ ([emphasis added] Ireland, Claim 411; Ireland, Claim 461). 
Material: Here, austerity was problematized for its adverse material consequences on living 
standards and, in particular, its disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups. The frame argued 
that austerity policies had ‘devastated people’s lives’ through a ‘general process of 
impoverishment’ that is ‘leaving thousands of families short of food’ (Ireland, Claim 275; 
Ireland, Claim 445; UK, Claim 640). This frame often focused on the most vulnerable, 
highlighting austerity as an ‘attack on the poorest people in society’ (Ireland, Claim 332). 
Proposals ranged from calls to reverse cuts, to more restrained calls for progressive budgetary 
choices when reducing public expenditure. The frame was motivated by appealing to principles 
of fairness when deciding on the distribution of the burden of spending cuts.  
Injustice: Injustice frames have been cited within the social movement literature as integral to 
collective action (Benford, 1997). To ‘place the blame for grievances on… “them”… sparks 
members of the “we” to respond’ (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 6). While all the frames 
contesting austerity contain such an injustice component, this is most advanced in the injustice 
frame. The frame diagnosed austerity as being deliberately imposed on citizens (a ‘we’), in 
response to a crisis that was said to be not of their making, but rather neoliberal or financial 
interests (a ‘them’). The frame thus rejected the premise of excessive public debt that the 
austerity paradigm was built on, arguing this debt was illegitimately shifted to citizens following 
the crisis and who must now ‘pay for a situation that is not of their making’ (UK, Claim 253). 
Proposals for alternatives typically cited redistribution, stronger financial regulation and efforts 
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to collect evaded/avoided taxes. Motivations appealed to principles of fairness that required 
financial elites to acknowledge their responsibility for the crisis, arguing their ‘moral debts are 
huge’ (Ireland, Claim 338). 
Democracy: Diagnoses here argued austerity’s application had undermined the democratic 
process and breached national sovereignty. The frame claimed austerity’s adoption through 
technocratic procedures (particularly when EU institutions were involved) unduly constrained 
national governments’ discretion, decrying that the ‘hands of future governments will be tied’ 
(Ireland, Claim 240). This led to broader concerns with the state of the democratic process and 
‘this effective suspension of democracy’ (UK, Claim 475). In terms of proposals, the diagnosis 
of constrained choices predisposed the frame to not be able to offer solutions. Where motivations 
were made, validating the diagnosis, they were rooted in appeals to democratic legitimacy.  
Charting the Austerity Debates 
Figure 1. Ireland: Debate on austerity 
 
Figure 2. UK: Debate on Austerity 
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Figures 1 and 2 show the public debates on austerity in Ireland and the UK respectively. 
The y-axis shows the percentages of claims made, the x-axis shows the time period 2010-2013.3 
In Ireland, support for austerity was initially more prevalent, but opposition increased in 2012 
and 2013. State actors articulated austerity far more than other actors in Ireland, peaking in the 
second half of 2012 with 87% of claims supporting austerity and falling to a minimum of only 
50% at the end of 2010. Actors who opposed austerity in the Irish debate were a mixture of state, 
political, and civil actors. In the UK, aside from the first and last constructed weeks, claims 
contesting austerity were dominant across the period. In the UK, state actors were similarly the 
most prevalent in articulating austerity, peaking at 74.3% at the end of 2012 and only falling to a 
minimum of 45% in 2013. State and political actors were similarly represented within the UK 
public debate in opposing austerity.   
Figure 3. Ireland: Frames articulating austerity 
                                                                 
3 ‘2010a’ refers to January 2010 – June 2010, ‘2010b’ refers to July 2010 – December 2010, etc. 
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Figure 4. UK: Frames articulating austerity 
 
Figure 3 shows the (relatively even) distribution of cognitive and normative frames used to 
articulate austerity in Ireland. Figure 4, in contrast, shows that the spread between the two in the 
UK was larger. Initially, as the crisis in Ireland became pronounced and a bailout increasingly 
likely, cognitive frames were marginally more significant, emphasising a perilous fiscal 
situation. In the UK, however, austerity was initially articulated on a normative basis. As the 
crisis intensified in 2011, a normative frame became more relevant in Ireland, while a cognitive 
one increased in the UK. As the immediate Eurozone crisis subsided in 2012, the gap between 
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the frames narrowed in Ireland. In the UK, however, the articulation of austerity shifted back to a 
normative framing. Into 2013, the gap between cognitive and normative framings narrowed in 
both countries.  
Figure 5. Ireland: Frames contesting austerity 
 
Figure 6. UK: Frames contesting austerity 
 
Figures 5 and 6 show that an economic frame was the most prominent frame used to contest 
austerity in both the UK and Irish debates. In the UK, it was overwhelmingly dominant until 
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2013. The discursive landscape was, however, more diverse in Ireland. The economic frame was 
popular with business and state actors in both countries. The material frame was the second most 
prevalent in both cases, although more so in Ireland than the UK. It wasn’t until the final 
constructed week that a material frame became the most significant in the UK. Civil and expert 
actors used the material frame more widely in both the UK and Ireland, while state and business 
actors were marginal. An injustice frame was initially well represented in Ireland, but was 
subsequently marginal across the rest of the period. In the UK, on the other hand, the injustice 
frame was for the most part negligible, only reaching a peak of 23.5% as the economic frame lost 
ground at the end of the period. State, civil, and political actors were evenly split in using this 
frame in both the UK and Ireland. Notably, in Ireland, business actors also used the frame. In the 
UK business actors did not use the injustice frame at all. In both cases, the democracy frame was 
largely peripheral to the debate. In the UK, it was frequently used to describe austerity policies in 
continental Europe, whereas in Ireland it was more likely directed towards their own situation 
within the bailout programme. 
Analysing Austerity’s Persistence  
The conditions of Ireland’s bailout set the institutional environment within which 
austerity was applied. Investigating the discursive process through which the pressures of the 
bailout were mediated, however, reveals how decisions were broadly steered towards an austerity 
paradigm in terms of focusing on flexibilizing labour markets or reducing welfare, as opposed to 
progressive tax increases. Interviewees highlighted that, even within the bailout, the Irish 
government had flexibility in allocating the burden of adjustment (Interview 3, 4, 5). One 
interviewee argued ‘they [the Troika] never said cut the minimum wage, they never said cut 
social welfare payment, they said get your budget down to 3% and there is a million ways of 
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doing that’ (Interview 4). Reportedly undermining more progressive budgetary choices was the 
government playing down the possibility for alternatives beyond the fiscal decisions they made. 
Interviewees highlighted that the ‘government was hiding behind the Troika’ in implementing 
the bailout programme (Interview 3). By arguing that they had little influence over the placement 
of budget cuts, that were said to be demanded from European institutions, the government 
distanced themselves from possible alternatives. From this perspective, austerity in Ireland was 
not a direct consequence of their bailout programme. Rather, it was the discursive mediation of 
the institutional opportunities that the bailout brought which drove policy towards a paradigm of 
austerity. This can be seen further in the public debate where the use of the democracy frame, 
while contesting austerity, reinforced a narrative of its inevitability in the face of external 
pressure. By arguing austerity was a ‘gun to my head’ political actors absolved themselves of 
responsibility for its implementation, feeding into the narrative regarding the institutional 
constraints of the bailout (Ireland, Claim 344). 
In the case of the UK, the institutional environment was more flexible in that there was no 
conditionality of a bailout requiring fiscal adjustment and the Fiscal Compact, which embedded 
rules on debt levels, was rejected. Instead, austerity was adopted as a democratic choice with the 
2010 election of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government. Nevertheless, while 
external institutional pressures could not be exploited, internal opportunities were taken to 
institutionalise austerity within policy processes. The 2011 Budget Responsibility and National 
Audit Act set up an Office for Budget Responsibility. This new body was responsible for 
monitoring fiscal responsibility, creating an institutional pressure for committing to an austerity 
paradigm. This was carried further in 2014 with the government’s Charter for Budget 
Responsibility, codifying requirements for a budgetary surplus and capping allowed welfare 
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spending. In sum, in the UK and Irish cases institutional pressures and opportunities were used 
differently to embed austerity as a response to the crisis. In Ireland, this was through 
emphasising the external pressure for fiscal adjustment from international institutions. In the UK, 
this was through the internal institutionalisation of austerity policies through the creation of new 
organisations and rules. 
Focusing more on the public debate, austerity’s resilience can be seen from its strength as a 
discourse and the corresponding weakness of the arguments mobilised against it. The key 
success of austerity as a discourse was setting the terms of the debate. The debate in the two 
countries, as it unfolded in the mass media, overwhelmingly focused on reducing public debt, 
based on a problematisation of the crisis as having been caused by state profligacy. This is in 
contrast to possible alternative narratives that focused on a crisis of growth (Hay & Smith, 2013). 
The most prevalent arguments mobilised in opposition to austerity failed to counter this crisis 
definition, and instead undertook the debate on the terms set by an austerity paradigm. This is 
despite opposition to austerity being largely predominant across the whole period in both 
countries, as seen in Figures 1 and 2. Looking into the different frames used to contest austerity, 
we can see this more clearly. 
The economic frame was restrained in the breadth of its opposition to austerity. As it appeared in 
the mass media, the economic frame’s diagnosis either accepted or did not explicitly dispute the 
premise of the austerity paradigm that public debt was too large and had been caused by 
overspending. Consequently, the objectives of the economic frame were closely aligned with 
those of the austerity paradigm, namely reducing public debt. The difference lay in the means to 
achieve these ends. The frame’s proposed solutions only demanded a slower pace to deficit 
reduction and greater fiscal flexibility to boost growth, rather than broader economic 
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transformation. On this basis, the economic frame was only going to be effective at a time when 
the sustainability of economic growth in the UK or Ireland was under threat. When this threat 
subsided, so did the basis of opposition upon this frame. This dynamic was particularly evident 
in the UK. As growth returned in 2013, the frame subsided in use and thus became less relevant 
as a basis for contesting the austerity paradigm. Furthermore, the economic frame as mobilised in 
the mass media, was a lop-sided opposition to austerity. The frame did little to challenge the 
normative imperatives of deficit reduction. This normative component provided a reliable 
counterpart in the austerity narrative by compensating for any cognitive dissonance where 
expenditure reductions did not lead to expected growth. In sum, despite being the most 
prominent frame used to contest austerity in the UK and Ireland, the economic argument 
provided only a minimal opposition to austerity. It focused on the pace of deficit reduction rather 
than its broader logic, and failed to provide a normative justification for alternatives that could 
counter the resonant moral imperatives of repaying one’s debts. 
The material frame was entirely defensive in its opposition to austerity. The frame sought to 
temper austerity’s excesses by focusing on the placement of cuts, rather than challenge the 
narrative it was built on. In the UK, the material frame was largely peripheral, overshadowed by 
economic arguments. It was only when the cognitive arguments of the economic frame proved 
redundant, as growth returned in 2013, that the material frame became more prominent. By this 
stage, however, the implementation of austerity was well under way and interpretations of the 
crisis that precipitated budget cuts were largely settled. Opposition therefore seemingly adopted 
a defensive stance by resisting specific cuts. In Ireland, the successful strategy of the government 
in establishing austerity as the only viable strategy given external pressures drew opposition 
towards the material frame to mitigate its consequences. One interviewee in Ireland argued ‘there 
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was a time when it didn’t matter what caused it [austerity], because the immediate debate was 
how do you manage it whilst not hurting society’ (Interview 4). This possibly explains the 
frame’s greater prevalence in Ireland compared to the UK, where there was greater scope for 
alternatives. 
The injustice frame had the reverse problem of the preceding frames. While making a diagnostic 
that fundamentally opposed austerity, disputing citizens’ culpability for the build-up of public 
debt, it was unable to mobilise significantly and drive effective policy change. The frame 
challenged the normative basis of an austerity paradigm by reapportioning blame for the crisis 
onto a financial elite, rather than profligate states. Such a frame could have feasibly redefined the 
narrative informing crisis responses, potentially making austerity less dominant as an orienting 
paradigm. A possible explanation for the weakness of the injustice frame is the actors that 
mobilised it. Business and state actors were less likely to use the injustice frame, suggesting a 
lack of appetite among more well-resourced, or politically influential, actors for substantive 
alternatives to austerity.  
Further factors in explaining the resilience of austerity include, in the UK, a divergence between 
austerity as a discourse and its practical application and, in Ireland, the ability to compromise on 
key issues. In the UK, it has been observed that, while as a discourse austerity remained at the 
centre of political debate, since 2011 actual spending cuts have been largely minimal (Krugman, 
2015). As growth figures deteriorated in the UK in 2011 and 2012, opposition to austerity 
increased, as seen in Figure 2, and focused predominantly on an economic frame. In response, 
austerity was tempered and economic stimulus measures taken. As an orienting discourse, 
however, austerity proved resilient. This was mediated in 2012 through a spike in the use of 
normative arguments justifying austerity, which provided a counterbalance against the economic 
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frame used against it. The return of growth in 2013, as the contractionary pressures of austerity 
subsided, saw a return of cognitive arguments re-justifying the efficacy of austerity, despite the 
reality being its effective curtailment. The economic frame subsequently subsided in 2013, 
seemingly discredited.  
In Ireland austerity’s resilience was helped by making compromises in response to opposition. 
For example, the significant mobilisation of the material frame took a tangible political form 
through the 2010 Poor Can’t Pay Campaign. This was met with commitments from the 
incoming Fine Gael and Labour Party government in 2011 on preserving minimum wage and 
welfare levels. Furthermore, the restructuring of Ireland’s debt through its 2013 promissory notes 
deal provided some relief against the arguments of the injustice frame, which was relatively 
significant in the Irish debate compared to the UK. In sum, by responding to opposition through 
compromise, austerity in Ireland was able to co-opt critiques seen in the public debate, while 
maintaining the broad trajectory of fiscal consolidation as a crisis response. 
Conclusion 
It has not been the specific aim of this article to offer a causal explanation for why austerity has 
arisen in the UK or Ireland. As it has been argued, explanations that have pointed to the causal 
weight of either ideas, interests, or institutions have tended to overstate the relative importance of 
one element or another, and treated it as a uniform and linear process. Instead, the article has 
unpacked how austerity has been differentially applied. Austerity as a discourse and political 
response to recent economic crises has been a Europe-wide phenomenon, affecting countries as 
diverse as Latvia, Greece, Portugal, and the UK. Despite this, even examining the relatively 
similar countries of the UK and Ireland has revealed austerity’s variegated nature. Of course, the 
analysis undertaken here has been restricted in its focus on only processes of framing in public 
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debates, thereby neglecting austerity’s manifestation within policy communities or political 
institutions. Nevertheless, beyond framing, the variegation identified in this article suggests the 
possibility of exploring ‘modes of austerity’ as the differential and context-specific application of 
austerity as a discursive and practical response to recent economic crises. The UK and Ireland 
arguably exhibited a neoliberal mode of austerity, given their embedding within an Anglo-liberal 
regime of neoliberalization. Within this, however, differences emerged through the presence of 
international institutions and national political dynamics. Additional modes could possibly 
include Europeanised austerity (via the influence of European institutions through bailouts), or 
creditor austerity (as Germany’s own pursuit of budgetary responsibility, despite limited 
problems of indebtedness). Exploring alternative modes through which austerity has been 
applied, and understanding their relationship to a largely austerity paradigm, will be a necessary 
and fruitful endeavour in order to broaden our understandings of it as a political phenomenon. 
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